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Abstract 
This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, 
indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the 
contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in 
Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing 
and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at 
minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between 
manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and 
service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal 
with these conflicts by restricting dealers’ decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive 
completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse 
of these powers is the manufacturers’ reputational capital. 
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A growing theoretical literature, starting with Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
Moore (1990), has studied the consequences of restricting the set of variables on which parties 
are allowed to contract. This approach (hereafter referred to as GHM) emphasizes that, when 
contingencies are unforeseen or indescribable, or the relevant information is observable but 
unverifiable, the allocation of property rights to the parties has implications for ex ante 
investment decisions. The assumption of ex post efficiency (conditional on investments) in this 
approach is problematic, however, when one considers the importance of voluntary compliance 
and enforcement costs, as Baker et al. (2003, 2004) have emphasized, following earlier work by 
Williamson (1985), Klein (1996), and Klein and Murphy (1988, 1997).  
We illustrate the actual way in which automobile franchising contracts are incomplete and 
how the parties use the contract to define how they will deal with this incompleteness. We show 
that the contracts are indeed far from complete; parties cannot simply agree on a mapping from 
states of the world to actions. However, and unlike in the GHM approach, the issue that the 
contracts are attempting to deal with is the presence of unforeseen contingencies themselves and 
the need for ex post adaptation to these contingencies; not merely the motivation of efficient ex 
ante investment under costless ex post bargaining. Since the costs of ex post renegotiation to 
optimal decisions is high, and in many cases the decisions themselves are ex post uncontractible, 
the contract lists the decision rights allocated to each party and gives one of them (the 
manufacturer) the right of enforcing the contracts, applying if necessary the ultimate punishment 
of terminating the relationship and destroying the quasi rents of one of them. 
Our perspective, which is also in the spirit of the literature on relational contracts and private 
legal orders,
1 holds important consequences. In contrast to what GHM would predict, when 
enforcement is costly, as Baker et al. (2004) have emphasized, the assignment of decision rights 
matters, even if investments are not specific. This is because the parties have different incentives 
with respect to actions (sales and service provision, pricing), and the existence of enforcement 
costs allows them to deviate from the ex post optimal action.   
The paper fits within recent empirical literature (for example, Arruñada, 2000, Arruñada et 
al., 2001, Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003, Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003) that has emphasized the 
allocation of rights and other non-monetary aspects of contracts both between and within firms. 
The difference with our previous work is twofold. First, while in Arruñada et al. (2001) we 
focused on the allocation of decision rights ex ante, showing that the rights assigned to 
manufacturers increase when dealers’ hazards are more prevalent and manufacturers are less 
prone to use these assigned rights opportunistically. The present paper concentrates on how these 
decision rights are exercised ex post. Second, while in Arruñada et al. we focused on 
                                                 
1 See, mainly, Macaulay (1963, 1985), Benson (1989), Ellickson (1991), Milgrom et al. (1990), Bernstein 





understanding the variation between the different contracts, here we focus on their common core 
and the nuanced interactions between contracts and legal institutions. As a result of this focus on 
commonalities, we do not undertake regression analysis to try to exploit and understand the 
between-brand variation. The interested reader is referred to Arruñada et al. for this analysis. 
We rely on the dealership contracts of the 23 automobile distribution networks in operation 
in Spain (including all of the important multinational firms), and on extensive interviews with 
industry experts.
2 The aim of the interviews was to shed light on how typical contractual 
practices work. Instead of focusing on the economic content of contracts in a strict sense, we aim 
to analyze the economic contribution of all aspects of these contracts (assignment of decision 
rights, monitoring and incentives) to the solution of incentive conflicts. Franchisees have 
incentives to sell fewer automobiles and provide less than optimal services due to both vertical 
and horizontal externalities (Klein, 1995). On the other side of the equation, manufacturers may 
expropriate individual dealers by lowering the margins after the contract was negotiated or by 
selling new dealerships in the same local market. In principle, they may also expropriate the 
entire network by underperforming on their police role or by underinvesting in brand 
maintenance.  
The contracts we study reduce the incidence of these conflicts through a complex set of 
vertical restraints monitoring and incentive mechanisms.
3 While some specifics of this 
contractual technology vary between contracts as a result of the different incidence and costs of 
moral hazard on both sides (see Arruñada et al., 2001), the structure and core content of the 
contracts, which is one of the focuses of the present article, are the same. 
The first element of the contractual technology is the assignment of decision rights to dealers 
and manufacturers. Contracts assign substantially similar decision rights to dealers and 
manufacturers of different brands. In particular, contracts consist, to a large extent, of a system 
of restraints that aims to limit the decision rights of dealers in order to increase the quantity of 
cars sold and to ensure a minimum quality of service. Dealers must attain sales targets set by 
manufacturers, they must provide predetermined levels of information and publicity, and they 
must attain certain levels of sales and after-sale services. Contracts also authorize manufacturers 
to decide the quantity and quality of the facilities, and the machinery and labor resources to be 
used by the dealer. In addition, they grant a wide range of decision rights. In particular, 
manufacturers hold extensive interpretation, implementation and enforcement powers. For 
                                                 
2 Fieldwork included 48 in-depth interviews with experts: the managers of the two trade associations, ANFAC 
and FACONAUTO, 23 franchisees of different brands and 23 managers of distribution networks. Manufacturers 
which participated in the study in Spain represent the following brands: Alfa Romeo, Audi, BMW, Chrysler, 
Citröen, Daewoo, Fiat, Ford, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar, Lancia, Mazda, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Opel, 
Peugeot, Renault, Rover, Seat, Skoda, Suzuki, Toyota, Volkswagen and Volvo. In 1994, these manufacturers 
produced 99.3% of the total number of automobiles sold in Spain. (Ministerio de Justicia e Interior, 1995). 
3 In analyzing the contractual technology as being composed of the assignment of decision rights, monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms, and compensation incentives, we use categories developed by Jensen (1983) and 





example, the contracts studied allow manufacturers to produce the demand forecast on which 
sales targets are based and to determine sanctions for non-performing dealers.  
A second component of the contractual technology is a monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism that allows manufacturers both to assess dealers’ performance and to ensure their 
compliance with these vertical restraints. Manufacturers are authorized in all 23 contracts to 
inspect crucial dimensions of inputs (machinery, personnel, etc.). They are also allowed to set 
output targets that dealers must attain, both in terms of sales and in customer satisfaction (as 
measured by polls). Finally, manufacturers may monitor dealers’ overall performance by 
regularly auditing dealers’ financial statements to asses their profitability. The aim of this 
assessment is to avoid the conflict posed by the debasement of long term incentives when 
dealers’ profits are too low. The whole monitoring and evaluation mechanism is used by the 
manufacturer to implement corrective policies and as an input into the reward and sanctioning 
mechanism established by the contracts.  
The third element of the contracts is two sets of monetary incentives, which ensure that the 
parties act so as to maximize joint value. These take the form of price discounts related to sales, 
customer satisfaction and termination rights. The contracts hardly seem concerned with the 
possibility of moral hazard on the manufacturer side. In particular, apart from the reputation of 
the manufacturer and the legal system, no contractual provision exists that may prevent abuses 
by the manufacturers of the decision rights the contracts grant them. We therefore expect 
reputation to matter a lot here, since manufacturers interact repeatedly with a large number of 
dealers. Opportunistic behavior towards them not only decreases the possibility of finding 
franchisees in the future, but also induces existing dealers to run down their level of service, 
damaging the brand’s value.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the reasons why franchising 
is the preferred organizational design and discusses the incentive incompatibility problems that it 
may create, which need to be dealt with by contracts. Sections 3 and 4 analyze different aspects 
of the contractual technology we observe: assignment of decision rights, monitoring and 





2. Franchising and double-sided moral hazard 
2.1. Organizational Design: The Choice of Franchising 
Dealers use two methods to organize their distribution network: (1) direct management of 
company-owned outlets and (2) franchising. They mostly rely on franchising, with only a small 
minority of outlets being directly owned and managed by manufacturers.
4  
The power of the incentives provided by each of these two arrangements is different. 
Franchising generates substantially stronger incentives, since franchisees receive the residual 
rent of their business. The incentives for managers of manufacturer-owned outlets are usually 
weaker, since they neither fully bear the costs nor fully enjoy the benefits of their decisions. For 
example, in the manufacturer-owned dealerships which were studied, between 70 and 80% of the 
total compensation of managers was unrelated to performance.
5  
These powerful incentives are necessary in the distribution of automobiles, likely because 
pricing decisions and the provision of (largely unobservable) sales and after-sale services must 
be decentralized, creating a large scope for moral hazard.  
First, the sale of automobiles frequently involves bargaining over price, this allows price 
discrimination to take place among buyers.
6 Part of the payment for a new car is often the trade-
in of a used vehicle. Reaching optimal decisions in both of these areas requires substantial 
decentralization of the pricing decision, which involves delegating essential decision rights to 
sellers. This may create a large scope for opportunistic behavior, due to the unobservability of 
the conditions motivating the individual pricing decisions. Thus, making the dealer a residual 
claimant saves on monitoring costs (while increasing other costs, more on this below). In most 
cases, the franchisee himself or the head of his sales department is in charge of the final pricing 
decision in negotiations that involve intense bargaining. Alfred Sloan (1964:282), among others, 
claimed that the generalization of the trade-in was the reason for the transition towards 
franchising in the 1920s.  
Second, the sale of automobiles requires the provision of information and other sale services 
to consumers. Again, this supply of information is hard to monitor, and setting the right 
                                                 
4 According to Rafer and Guest (1996:7, 46), the share of franchised dealerships in 1995 was 99.27% in the 
UK, 95.92% in France, 98.94% in Germany, and 99.33% in Italy. In Spain, only 71 of the 3,031 dealers existing at 
the end of 1995 were owned by manufacturers, and only five manufacturers owned at least a dealership. Moreover, 
in none of these cases was the percentage of manufacturer-owned dealerships larger than 13% of the total number of 
dealerships. 
5 Franchisees in the same industry and country have been found to be 35% more profitable than company-
owned outlets (Arruñada and Vázquez, 2003). Part of the reason is that while worker’s productivity is 6% lower, 
average labor costs are 11% higher in owned outlets. 





incentives implies a close dependency of the income of the seller on the conclusion of the 
transaction.  
Finally, cars are durable goods—that is, they are deposits of future transport services. In 
order for manufacturers to guarantee the homogeneous quality of automobiles, it is necessary 
that dealers deliver standard after-sale services. Since these after-sale services are credence 
goods, whose quality is only known in the long term, if ever (Darby and Karni, 1973), 
monitoring their quality is costly. A contract that makes dealers responsible for after-sale 
services, and makes them bear most of the cost of low quality of after-sale services, reduces the 
potential for moral hazard in this respect.
7  
The prevalence of franchising as an organizational form for this industry supports the view 
that, if managers are to be allowed such a large degree of control over pricing, service provision 
and the purchase of used cars, they must also be provided with high-powered incentives. 
Transferring the ownership of the dealership to them, transforming them into “dealers,” achieves 
precisely this aim, by making the manager claimant to the residual income.  
2.2. Double-sided moral hazard and incentive conflicts in franchising 
By creating stronger incentives, franchising goes a long way towards motivating managers to 
deliver high levels of promotional and other services, and to make careful pricing decisions. 
However, given the strength of the incentives, it also has the potential to motivate gaming 
behavior. In particular, dealers have incentives to undertake suboptimal decisions concerning 
both pricing and services provided, decisions which would harm not only the manufacturer, but 
also other dealers in the network. There is also a large scope for opportunism on the side of the 
manufacturer, rooted both in its police role and in its ability to reduce dealers’ quasi-rents 
through the sale of new dealerships or through increases in sales targets. 
Suboptimal pricing may arise because dealers are in a position to practice double 
marginalization. Since they enjoy territorial protection, they also benefit from manufacturers’ 
market power. If they can set their prices freely, they will add their own price-cost margin on top 
of the manufacturer’s price-cost margin, so that a smaller quantity of automobiles is sold than 
that which would maximize the value of a vertically integrated manufacturer-dealer. Another 
consequence of this market power is that dealers have an incentive to provide less promotional 
and sales services than optimal, since the marginal return they obtain from these services is only 
a part of the total return on an extra sale (the sum of both mark-ups). In fact, this distortion on 
the level of promotional and sales service provided by dealers remains even when dealers have 
no market power, as long as cars are sold to them at a price higher than marginal production cost 
(Klein and Murphy, 1988).  
                                                 
7 Evidence on the same services points to the importance of this argument. Brickley and Dark (1987:411) found 
that networks specializing in automobile repairs were the least likely to directly manage an outlet (they did so in 
only 4% of the cases). Shepard (1993:65) found that the probability that a gas station was owned by a franchisor 





Horizontal externalities aggravate the underprovision of informational and promotional 
services.
8 Dealers generate information by investing in publicity and providing certain services. 
Consumers have incentives to obtain information from the dealers who provide it and then 
acquire their car from other dealers, who may sell at lower prices but do not provide this 
information. This free riding by dealers reduces the total supply of publicity and information, 
which decreases the final demand for cars.
9  
On the other side of the relationship, manufacturers may expropriate individual dealers by 
lowering their margins under threat of termination. This is particularly credible when directed 
against marginally performing dealers, or when technological changes require changes in the 
structure or operation of the dealerships. In both of these cases, it will be difficult for third party 
enforcers to distinguish opportunistic from disciplinary cancellation.
10 Manufacturers may also 
increase the number of dealerships sold in the same local market. Finally, manufacturers can 
raise opportunistically the sales targets that dealers must attain, producing a “ratchet” effect 
(Freixas et al., 1985).  
Rather than expropriating the future rents of an individual dealer, some actions by 
manufacturers may expropriate the rents of all of them. This is typically the case when 
manufacturers underperform in their police role. Less policing increases the extent of 
opportunistic behavior by dealers, decreasing the value of the brand and the dealers’ brand-
specific assets. More generally, manufacturers may underinvest in brand maintenance, for 
example, by following a downmarket strategy and lowering their investments in new products, 
advertising, training and promotion.  
To sum up, governance structure in this industry must tackle potential conflicts between the 
dealer and manufacturer. On the dealer side, it must deal with the possibility of suboptimal 
pricing and service decisions, and it must protect the manufacturer’s quasi-rents. On the 
manufacturer side, it must reduce the potential for opportunistic expropriation of the dealer’s 
quasi-rents by the manufacturer and it must ensure that manufacturers undertake the optimal 
level of training, advertising, promotion and quality control.  
The following three sections examine the way automobile franchise contracts deal with these 
problems. They do so by analyzing three aspects of the contractual technology: the assignment 
of decision rights, the performance evaluation systems, and the incentive mechanisms used to 
align the objectives of the parties. 
                                                 
8 This free rider problem is dealt with by Telser (1960), Rubin (1978), Klein (1980, 1995), and Klein and 
Leffler (1981). 
9 During the 60s, manufacturers and dealers who provided a high level of service engaged in frequent trials in 
the U.S. against those who free rode on them by having a small labor force and no autos in exhibition (Klein, 
1995:13). 
10 Williams (1999) shows, however, that terminations by franchisors are infrequent (fewer than 4% annually), 
and that the conditional probability of termination decreases significantly as outlet performance increases, the 





3. Ex ante assignment of decision rights  
The core content of all contracts limits the decision rights of dealers, and in parallel grants to 
manufacturers a general decision right to fill in or complete the contract in several crucial 
dimensions ex post.  
All contracts limit dealers’ decision rights through clauses aiming to prevent double 
marginalization, to ensure that dealers provide an adequate level of sales and service, and to 
protect the quasi-rents generated by specific investments undertaken by manufacturers and other 
dealers. Table 1 summarizes the frequency with which these clauses are used in our sample. 
Sales targets and double marginalization. In order to deal with the inclination of dealers to 
charge prices which are too high and sell too few units, all contracts authorize manufacturers to 
impose sales targets on dealers. These targets are defined in terms of the market share that the 
dealer must achieve in the relevant local market, and then communicated to dealers in the form 
of the sales volume they must achieve. They are then used to compensate dealers through 
substantial discounts in the wholesale price of the cars they buy from the manufacturer. Targets 
are set every year in January, relying on forecasts elaborated by manufacturers based on 
historical sales data in the dealer’s market and at the national level. Of 23 manufacturers, 16 do 
not desegregate these targets by model—that is, they specify only the total number of cars to be 
sold in a particular market. Conflicts about product mix are unlikely to arise, however, since both 
manufacturer and dealer prefer to sell higher margin (often luxury or larger) cars. The extent to 
which targets are achieved is provisionally calculated using official data desegregated by model 
and municipality. Every month dealers receive the estimated discount for the previous month. At 
the end of the year the annual figure is calculated and the final discount settled.  
These numerical targets are revised whenever either the sales of automobiles in the whole 
national market or the market share of the brand in the national market are lower than forecasted. 
In the latter case, when revisions are caused by a drop in the brand’s share, the market share 
target of the dealer is also revised accordingly. The dealer is therefore partly insured against the 
risk derived from both poor aggregate car market performance (the dealer’s market share target 
is kept constant in this case) and from relatively poor brand performance (both the share and 
volume targets are revised).
11 This system is therefore in accordance with the informativeness 
principle (Holmstrom, 1979), which says that all information that illuminates the effort provided 
by the agent should be used if it can be obtained at low cost.  
Decision rights on the performance benchmarks are left entirely in the hands of the 
manufacturer. Little exists in the contracts to constrain the ability of manufacturers to cheat 
when setting or revising objectives. The extent to which these targets are met is the crucial 
variable determining dealers’ compensation, as we shall show below. By manipulating sales 
targets, manufacturers could lower dealers’ profits below ex ante expectations. Moreover, the 
fact that different targets are set every year might generate a ratchet effect, which would limit the 
                                                 
11 The dealer is only partly insured against low brand penetration or low aggregate sales, since his income falls 





effectiveness of the incentives used in the contract. However, contracts only contain a vague 
mechanism to limit the possibility of opportunistic behavior in this dimension, namely the 
dealer’s right to have the sales target revised during the year when aggregate sales are too low.  
Restrictions on sale services. Contracts have clauses aiming to avoid dealers delivering a 
service level inferior to the one that maximizes the value of a vertically integrated manufacturer-
dealer. They all establish limits on the quantity of inputs that dealers must use to deliver these 
services, such as showrooms, advertisement, inventory, and personnel; impose obligations on 
dealers concerning the size and decor of showrooms; and oblige dealers to invest in local 
advertising. Furthermore, 15 of 23 contracts allow manufacturers to decide dealers’ promotional 
and advertising expenses and contents, while the rest establish that these expenses must be a 
fixed proportion (between 0.75% and 1%) of gross revenue. In addition, all contracts require 
dealers to maintain automobile inventory at levels determined by manufacturers, usually 
equivalent to 45 days of sales.
12 Finally, contracts oblige dealers to hire enough sales personnel 
and with sufficient training, usually acquired through mandatory courses organized by the 
manufacturer and paid for by the dealers. 
Restrictions on after-sale services. These clauses aim to control the quality of after-sale 
services provided by dealers and show little variation, as all contracts focus on the inputs used. 
First, dealers are subject to manufacturers’ directions concerning the machines and tools 
necessary to provide maintenance and repair services. They must hire enough well-trained 
personnel to deliver the after-sale services and must send their own employees to training 
workshops organized by the manufacturer. Moreover, manufacturers determine the organization 
and dimension of the garage where this service is delivered. Dealers were also obliged in all 
contracts to use original spare parts in repairs covered by warranty (whose cost is borne by the 
manufacturer), and to use quality spare parts in non-warranty repairs. Finally, in all contracts, 
dealers undertake the obligation to keep a minimum stock of spare parts, in order to avoid delays 
in after-sale services. Most manufacturers (18 of 23) retain discretion in determining this stock.  
 
Contracts also avoid a low quality of sale and after-sale services by imposing on dealers the 
obligation to provide “customer satisfaction” as measured by customer surveys. Even though 
fulfillment of this obligation is difficult to verify by third parties, clauses to this effect are 
present in 13 of the 23 contracts, constructing monetary incentives which link price discounts to 
the level of service.  
Protection of investments of manufacturers. Manufacturers must make specific investments 
in order to create their reputational capital and develop their commercial networks. Dealers may 
take advantage of these investments by distributing the cars of other firms or providing after-sale 
services for them. Contracts protect the property rights of manufacturers over these investments 
with several clauses that affect the possibility of competition during and after their contractual 
                                                 
12 Most contracts grant discretion on this issue to manufacturers, while only 5 mandate the 45-day stock in the 
contract. Manufacturers have little incentive to abuse this discretion, since these stocks are usually co-financed by 





relation. All contracts thus require dealers who sell automobiles of different manufacturers to 
maintain differentiated dealerships and management during the duration of the contract. In 
addition, dealers are not allowed to use the brand of the manufacturer after the contract 
terminates. Moreover, 20 of the 23 networks reserve for manufacturers the right to acquire from 
their dealers any new cars that remain unsold at termination. Similarly, eight contracts grant 
manufacturers the right to buy back unused original spare parts, signs and specialized tools at the 
time of expiration.  
Protection of dealers’ investments. Dealers’ specific investments also enjoy some protection 
against expropriation by the manufacturer and other dealers. The most important of these 
protections is probably the implicit safeguard supplied by the manufacturer’s reputation, given 
that it must deal repeatedly with a large number of dealers. Some explicit protection against 
expropriation is also provided by European law, mainly Regulation (EU) 1475/95, the rule in 
force at the time of our sample, which included: minimum notification requirements before 
termination (art. 5.2.), a general ban on discrimination among dealers (art. 5.1.2.b.), and a 
restriction on the possibility of reducing the exclusive area of dealers by granting new 
concessions in it (art. 6.1.5.). In addition, these contracts define territorial limits for dealerships, 
forbidding each of them to market actively outside their assigned territories. This should protect 
dealer-specific assets against competition by other dealers of the same brand.
13  
                                                 
13 On the other hand, contracts allow manufacturers to close down allegedly underperforming dealers or even to 
sell new dealerships in the exclusive areas. Thus, dealers’ territories are not protected by contract against 
manufacturer opportunism. Moreover, for the contractual protection against other dealers to be effective, the 
manufacturer has to perform in his role of network policing. The ultimate safeguard then becomes, again, his 
reputation. For these reasons, territorial protection should be understood as a way of preserving the decision rights 









Table 1. Share of contracts that include the clauses analyzed 
Double marginalization clauses   
Sales targets  100.0% 
Sale services clauses   
Minimum publicity investment  100.0% 
Signs 100.0% 
Design and size of showroom  100.0% 
Minimum stock of new vehicles  100.0% 
Minimum size of sales force  100.0% 
Compulsory sales-force training  65.2% 
Trial vehicles  52.1% 
After-sale services clauses   
Machinery and Tools  100.0% 
Organization and size of workshop  100.0% 
Minimum number of after-sale personnel  100.0% 
Compulsory training of after-sale personnel  100.0% 
Minimum quality of spare parts  100.0% 
Minimum stock of spare parts  100.0% 
Protection of investments of manufacturers (non competing clauses)    
Exclusive distribution of own manufacturer’s automobiles  100.0% 
Right to buy unsold new vehicles at the time of expiration  87.0% 
Right to buy unused original spare parts, signs and tools at the time of termination  34.8% 
Protection of investments of dealers   
Territorial protection  100.0% 
Right of manufacturer to sell directly in exclusive territory of dealer   47.8% 
Right to sell  unused original spare parts, signaling elements and specialized tools   8.7% 
Monitoring clauses   
Manufacturer right to undertake direct inspections of dealership  100.0% 
Dealer duty to provide accounting data.   87.0% 
Manufacturer right to authorize management changes  87.0% 
Manufacturer right to audit dealer accounting   52.2% 
Manufacturer right to establish minimum operating capital and net worth  52.2% 
Non-cure clauses   
Repeated breach of sales and service targets   100.0% 
Change of management or death or disability of dealer  82.6% 
Disagreement among partners or managers   60.9% 
Change of location   60.9% 
Appointment of liquidator  56.5% 
Court verdict against dealer, partner or manager of dealership  43.5% 
False information provided to manufacturer  34.8% 
Loss of control of the premises   8.7% 
Dealership closed for a holiday period longer than normal  8.7% 





4. Exercising decision rights ex post 
4.1. Contract Completion 
Decision rights granted by contract allow manufacturers to interpret and fill in the contract 
and to act as enforcers. Manufacturers thus build the demand forecasts on which sales objectives 
are based. They alone decide, within the broad limits defined by law,
14 what constitutes 
underperformance on the part of a particular dealer, and which specific sanctions are applicable 
to punish underperformance. Moreover, they may adapt the contract to new technological 
circumstances by deciding, for example, to reorganize the network.
15  
The relationship therefore features a large degree of asymmetry. While contracts describe the 
duties of dealers in detail, those of manufacturers are described vaguely, so that they enjoy 
substantial discretion. Furthermore, no incentive mechanism is provided by contract to ensure 
manufacturers compliance. This apparent lack of balance seems to expose dealers to a large risk 
of expropriation by manufacturers.  
Assigning residual decision rights to one party may be efficient in long term relations 
characterized by a large degree of uncertainty, in order to decrease bargaining costs. It is only 
natural to grant this authority to the party that contracts more often and who has the largest 
reputational capital. The large investments made by manufacturers to create a brand name 
provide an implicit guarantee of their honest behavior. Manufacturers are involved in repeated 
transactions with a large number of dealers all over the country. A strategy of expropriation of 
dealers’ quasi-rents would therefore be costly to them: not only because the possibility of finding 
good dealers would decrease, but also because current dealers would reduce their quality of 
service in order to recover the quasi-rents associated with their specific investments as soon as 
possible. 
4.2. Monitoring 
In order to ensure compliance with the vertical restraints discussed above, and to determine 
the application of monetary incentive mechanisms (sales and discounts) discussed in the next 
section, contracts allow manufacturers to evaluate the performance of dealers. In agreement with 
the informativeness principle, all of the low cost information available is used in these contracts: 
information on outputs of sales and services, information on the observable inputs, and 
information on dealership finances.  
                                                 
14 Two limits to the manufacturer’s discretion established by legislation and judicial precedent in Spain are the 
“good faith” exception (art. 7.1. of the Spanish Civil Code) and the need to respect the implicit will of the parties to 
the contract (art. 1258). We discuss more extensively below the legal framework in relation to the right of the 
manufacturer to terminate the contract. 
15 For example, art 5.3 of Regulation (EU) 1,475/95 authorizes manufacturers to terminate a contract (with a 





Manufacturers spend resources on acquiring information about two outputs of dealers—sales 
and customer satisfaction. They use this information to build two performance measures. First, 
manufacturers set and follow up yearly sales targets. Second, 17 of 23 manufacturers poll their 
clients to measure customer satisfaction along several dimensions such as cleanness of 
showroom, helpfulness and effectiveness in solving problems, satisfaction with the sales staff, 
etc. These two sets of observable outputs are then linked with dealer compensation through price 
discounts.  
Contracts also allow manufacturers to directly monitor some of the dealers’ inputs, by 
providing for inspections. Inspectors visit dealerships randomly at their discretion to ensure 
compliance with input obligations related to the provision of an adequate service level. The 
information obtained through these inspections is used only in the termination decision, 
apparently having no direct impact on the monetary incentive system.  
Finally, manufacturers closely monitor the financial condition of dealers, since the incentives 
for dealers to fulfill their obligations decrease as their profitability decreases. Heavily indebted 
dealers are more likely to have short-term objectives, thus reducing the level of services 
delivered and potentially damaging the brand reputation.
16 This monitoring is implemented in 20 
out of 23 networks through the dealers’ obligation to periodically present their financial 
statements. Some manufacturers go further, by having their own staff audit the accounts of 
dealers (12 out of 23) or even, in two cases, integrating the entire accounting system of the 
dealers with their own. The financial health of dealers is also ensured in most networks (12) by 
granting to the manufacturer a right to set minimum solvency ratios for dealers.  
Dealers also undertake some monitoring of manufacturers. Since for individual dealers it 
would hardly ever be profitable to undertake this function, monitoring of manufacturers is 
undertaken by dealers’ associations at both brand and inter-brand level. Interestingly, 
manufacturers are closely involved in creating and financing these monitoring organizations, 
probably in order to increase their commitment to behave honestly towards dealers.  
Two institutional arrangements facilitate monitoring by dealers of the manufacturer conduct. 
First, all networks have dealer councils, usually partially financed by manufacturers. Their 
functions are: (a) to represent networks in front of the manufacturer when discussing future 
strategies and problems; (b) to ensure that manufacturers apply control mechanisms in a fair, 
non-discriminating way; (c) to provide legal assistance to dealers in their conflicts; and (d) to 
attain scale economies in the acquisition of some inputs, such as office supplies.  
Second, all dealer associations belong to the national dealer association (FACONAUTO) 
which, apart from lobbying in the political arena and negotiating with manufacturers, has also 
been involved in determining whether a manufacturer is unfairly expropriating from all of the 
members of the dealer network. In at least one case, the association found that the dealers of a 
particular network (Daihatsu) were being expropriated by the manufacturer when the 
                                                 
16 Rubin (1978:228) pointed out that one of the functions of franchisors is precisely to force the closure of 





manufacturer reduced the promotional investments below what had been agreed, stopped 
subsidizing the stock of dealers and did not fulfill the deadlines for automobile delivery. 
4.3. Termination 
In the presence of quasi-rents, the prospect of termination promotes compliance. Indeed, the 
contracts we analyze do not rely exclusively on targets and discounts to provide performance 
incentives to dealers, but provide for three types of termination: at will, automatic and due to 
breach of contract.  
Termination at will, through the introduction in the contracts of the so-called ad nutum 
clause, allows the parties to terminate the contract at any time when the contract is for unlimited 
duration, or not to renew it if it is for a limited duration (Paz-Ares, 1997:8). However, both 
European legislation and the general rules of Spanish contract law substantially limit this 
discretion. As we discussed in section 3, EU legislation at the time of our sample required a two-
year notice (art. 5.2.2. of Regulation (EU) 1,475/95), unless the contract was of limited duration 
(in which case termination only required a 6-month notice) and it forbid discrimination among 
dealers (art. 5.1.2.b). Moreover, Spanish law further restricts manufacturer’s ability to terminate 
by imposing obligations of good faith (Civil Code, art. 7) and respect to the implicit will of the 
parties. The most restrictive interpretation of these clauses reads them to imply several duties: a 
duty of trust (deber de confianza) which obliges the principal to allow the dealer enough time to 
recover the investment made, a duty of previous notification, and a duty of cooperating in the 
liquidation of the dealership. Other more expansive interpretations of these rules take them to 
forbid any “arbitrary” behavior by the manufacturer (Paz-Ares, 1997:46-8). Clearly, all these 
restrictions decrease the desirability of using termination at will to punish non-performing 
dealers, particularly since, according to some authors, they allow for considerations of fairness to 
be introduced by the court.  
The contracts also determine several nonperformance conditions which lead to automatic 
termination.
17 In particular, these contracts punish repeated non-fulfillment of the sales and 
service targets with automatic termination. While most brands do not specify the thresholds they 
use to define these criteria, seven of them have made available to the authors the specific non-
performance criteria that lead to automatic termination. As Table 2 shows, these criteria usually 
involved missing a percentage of the sales targets (around 80%) during several consecutive years 
or during a given number of years in a five-year period. The other circumstances leading to 
automatic termination are connected to changes in the ownership or financial condition of the 
dealership, as shown in Table 1.
18  
                                                 
17 The Spanish court system has repeatedly upheld this type of termination. The Supreme Court, in Sentence 
990/1995, agreed with the termination without compensation of a dealer who did not attain his sales objectives 
during three consecutive months. Several lower court decisions also coincide on the permissibility of this measure. 
18 In particular, all contracts punish with automatic termination a change in the ownership of the dealer, 






Table 2. Thresholds for automatic contract termination 
Manu-
facturer 
Termination if sales lower than
(as a percentage of sales objective) 
Termination if service lower than  
(as percent of satisfaction objective) 
2  2 consecutive years or  
3 alternating years 80% 
2 consecutive years or  
3 alternating years 80% 
5  3 consecutive years 85%  3 consecutive years 85% 
8  3 consecutive years 80%  3 consecutive years 85% 
12  2 consecutive years 75%  2 consecutive years 85% 
15  2 consecutive years 80%  2 consecutive years 85% 
18  2 consecutive years 85%  2 consecutive years 85% 
22  3 consecutive years 80%  2 consecutive years 95% 
Source: Dealership contracts. Manufacturers assigned a number in order to safeguard their anonymity.  
Note: Only the manufacturers listed in this table specify the criteria for termination for repeated breach. 
Finally, termination for breach of contract is caused by the failure to perform contractual 
obligations which are not established in the contract as causes of automatic termination. 
Contracts require a 90 to 180 days notice for this type of termination. During this time, dealers 
are allowed to make an attempt to “cure” their non-performance.  
4.4. Monetary Incentives 
Dealers produce two valuable outputs: sales and customer satisfaction with the service 
received. Contracts create monetary instruments to affect these two outputs, by linking discounts 
in the price that manufacturers charge to dealers with the dealers’ sales and service performance. 
In 20 out of the 23 networks studied, dealers can obtain discounts as a function of the degree to 
which they achieve their sales targets
19. Table 3 shows the discounts applied to the prices of all 
vehicles acquired by dealers between 1993 and 1995. For example, dealers who met their annual 
sales targets received a mean discount of 2.11% of the price of all the automobiles they had 
acquired from the manufacturer in that year. The importance of these discounts is such that most 
dealers would be unable to obtain any profits if they were not receiving them.
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
when there is disagreement among partners (14 contracts), when the management or location of the dealership is 
changed without the manufacturer’s approval (14 contracts), or when a court rules against the dealer in a way that, 
according to the manufacturer, might damage the brand name (10 contracts). 
19 The three networks that did not use discounts declared in interviews that they do set and follow up sales 
targets, however, these targets are used only to impose disciplinary termination and to justify it before third party 
enforcers. Thus these three networks rely exclusively on termination to provide incentives to their dealers. 
20 Compare these discounts with the average return on sales in a random sample of 179 Spanish dealers, which 





Table 3. Discount on automobile price charged by manufacturers to dealers, as a function of dealers’ achievement of 
sales targets set by manufacturers 
Percent of sales objective achieved  Mean discount received  Man
ufac-
turer  ≥ 80%  ≥ 85%  ≥ 90%  ≥ 95%  ≥ 
100% 
≥ 
105%  ≥ 110% 1993 1994 1995 
1  -  -  1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 0.97%  1.06%  1.14% 
2
*  -  -  20,000 20,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 1.08% 1.22% 1.38% 
3  -  1%  1.5% 2%  2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.70%  1.89%  1.71% 
4  1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 1.85%  2.06%  2.34% 
5  -  0.5%  1% 1.5%  2% 2% 2% 1.67%  1.94%  n.a. 
6  1% 1% 2% 2% 2.5%  2.5%  2.5%  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
7  -  -  1.5% 1.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.58%  1.72%  1.65% 
8
*  10,000 10,000 20,000 20,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 1.2%  1.7%  1.9% 
10  1.5% 2%  2.5% 3%  3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 2.7% 3.3% 3.2% 
12  -  0.5% 1%  1.5% 2%  2.5% 3%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
13 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 1.6%  1.9%  2.1% 
14
*  10,000 10,000 20,000 20,000 25,000 25,000 25,000 1.02% 1.12% 1.27% 
15 -  -  1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 0.92%  0.99%  1.07% 
16 -  0.5%  1% 1.5%  2% 2% 2% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
17 1% 1% 1.5%  1.5%  2% 2% 2% 1.14%  1.46%  1.64% 
18  0.5% 0.5% 1.5% 1.5% 3%  3%  3%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
19  - - 1.5%  1.5%  2%  2%  2%  1.21%  1.56%  1.48% 
20
*  5,000  5,000  10,000 10,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 0.85% 0.98% 1.14% 
21  1.5% 1.5% 2%  2%  2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.35%  1.61%  1.72% 
22  - - 1.5%  1.5%  3%  3%  3%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Mean 0.43% 0.56% 1.28% 1.39% 2.11% 2.13% 2.15% 1.39% 1.63% 1.70% 
Source: Interviews with manufacturers. Manufacturers have been assigned a number in order to safeguard their anonymity. We transform 
numerical discounts into percentages by using the ratio of the absolute cash discounts to the average price of a car charged by each manufacturer 
to his dealers. Notes: n.a.: not available. 
* In pesetas per automobile sold.  
Sales-related price discounts may achieve two aims: they motivate a higher effort level by 
dealers and they reduce the price charged to the final consumer. Both of these results will lead to 






Table 4. Discounts in automobile price obtained by dealers as a function of consumers’ evaluation of dealers in 
polls 
Percent of service objective achieved  Mean discount received  Manu
-fac-
turer  70% 75% 80% 85%  90%  95% 100%  1993  1994  1995 
1  -  0.5625%  0.6%  0.6375% 0.675% 0.712% 0.75%  0.68% 0.61% 0.63% 
2    0.7% 0.75% 0.8% 0.85% 0.9%  0.95% 1%  0.91%  0.84%  0.87% 
3  -  0.9375%  1%  1.0625% 1.125% 1.185% 1.25%  1.13% 1.09% 1.16% 
5 n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.75%  0.56%  0.61%  n.a. 
6  -  0.45% 0.48%  0.51% 0.54% 0.57% 0.6%  0.54%  0.55%  0.54% 
8  0.64% 0.7%  0.76% 0.82%  0.88%  0.94%  1%  0.96% 0.96% 0.97% 
12  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 1% n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
14  0.42%  0.45% 0.48%  0.51% 0.54% 0.57% 0.6%  0.52%  0.48%  0.46% 
15  -  0.35% 0.38%  0.41% 0.44% 0.47% 0.5%  0.38%  0.43%  0.42% 
16  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
17  0.35% 0.375% 0.4%  0.425% 0.45%  0.475% 0.5%  0.40% 0.38% 0.44% 
18  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4%  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
19  -  0.375% 0.4%  0.425% 0.45%  0.475% 0.5%  0.34% 0.39% 0.39% 
Mean 0.23% 0.55%  .589% 0.627% 0.667% 0.705% 0.727% 0.64% 0.63% 0.65% 
Source: Interviews with manufacturers. Manufacturers have been assigned a number in order to safeguard their anonymity.  
Note: n.a.: not available.  
The effort vector is, in fact, multidimensional, and an increase in the sales effort does not 
necessarily lead to higher customer satisfaction. The price discount system we observe aims to 
solve this problem by complementing the quantity related price discounts with a quality related 
system. In 13 out of the 23 networks, dealers can obtain discounts as a function of the evaluation 
made by the clients of their services, as Table 4 shows. When customer satisfaction is highest, 
the mean discount that dealers could obtain annually was 0.73% of the price of all automobiles 
they acquired from the manufacturers. This number is large compared, for example, with average 
dealer profitability (see note 20).
21 
4.5. Use Of Termination And Discounts 
Termination is used to deal with serious or repeated non-performance as observed through 
the outputs, inputs and financial statements of the dealer. Price discounts are relied upon to 
provide incentives on both the “effort” and pricing dimensions of dealer behavior on a 
continuous, modulated basis. Sales and service targets play a dual role in this system: they 
directly determine yearly dealer compensation, and they provide an important input in the 
termination process, since, should litigation be necessary, they are court-verifiable variables. 
                                                 
21 See Arruñada et al. (2001) for a systematic empirical analysis of the variation in the strength of sales and 





We have uncovered, moreover, important constraints on the use of termination by the 
manufacturer which further reduce the role that termination may play in the relation. 
Termination usually requires the intervention of the courts. This not only increases its cost as a 
method for contract enforcement, but it also creates the need for the manufacturer to actually 
prove the breach of contract, which involves important monetary and time costs. In addition, the 
judiciary process creates some uncertainty, since, as we have seen, the courts are concerned 
about factors other than breach, such as “fairness.”
22 In this respect, it is worth noting that the 
evaluation and compensation system we observe has a larger component of self-enforcement 
than termination often does. Setting sales targets and discounts does not require judiciary 
intervention, while termination is subject, often regardless of the ex ante will of the parties, to 
third party review. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Franchising dominates the organization of automobile distribution because of the need to 
decentralize pricing and service decisions. However, incentive incompatibility problems persist 
due mainly to the existence of double-sided moral hazard. These problems concern the level of 
sales, the quality of service provided and the risks of expropriation of the investments 
undertaken by both parties. Parties to these transactions formulate contracts whose aim is to deal 
with these problems. 
The auto dealer contracts analyzed in this paper present a large degree of homogeneity both 
within brands and across brands. They use three mechanisms to solve the incentive conflicts 
confronted. First, all contracts limit ex ante the decision rights of dealers to achieve optimal sales 
and ensure minimum quality levels, while granting extensive interpretation, implementation and 
enforcement powers to manufacturers. Second, contracts establish evaluation and monitoring 
mechanisms that allow manufacturers to observe two dimensions of the output vector (sales and 
customer satisfaction) and a variety of the inputs (number and quality of workers, local 
advertising, machinery) and performance (financial data). Third, contracts use two types of 
instruments, price discounts and termination, to ensure compliance and to align the incentives of 
dealers and manufacturers.  
Quantity related price discounts are characterized by their large size, by their increasing in a 
more than linear manner up to the sales target, and by the reliance of the monitoring system to 
which they are linked on relative performance measures. Price discounts linked to customer 
satisfaction increase also in a non-linear way with this variable and, when they exist, are 
relatively large. This dual system of price discounts allows manufacturers to affect two crucial 
                                                 
22 Klein (1995:28) has also pointed out that the legal system is often reluctant to allow termination at will when 





choices made by dealers: the prices they set for automobiles and the sales and service effort they 
provide. 
Termination of the contractual relation by the manufacturers plays a role as a last resort 
incentive and disciplinary device. In the contractual process and practice we observe, 
termination is mostly used to punish repeated and serious non-performance.  
The asymmetry that characterizes the assignment of decision rights to the parties is present 
in all phases of the contract. Not only do manufacturers assume the role of policing the relation 
and completing the contracts, but their obligations are less specified. Moreover, there are no 
contractual enforcement mechanisms, apart from reputation, to punish their non-performance.  
The analysis undertaken here sheds light on the role of both the monetary and non-monetary 
clauses of contracts in solving the incentive conflicts created by franchising. It reveals a complex 
incentive and enforcement system. The non-linear price discount mechanism, together with the 
role of the manufacturer in completing, interpreting and enforcing the contract, and with the 
possibility of termination as an ultimate sanction, may go a long way towards aligning the 
incentives of both parties, in contrast with the simple, often linear, incentive schemes 
encountered in other relations. By extensively relying on ex post adjustments, and giving one of 
the parties (the manufacturer) the right to police such adjustments, contract incompleteness 
provides a mechanism to adapt the decisions of both parties to day-to-day changes in 
circumstances. Further theoretical work is necessary to illuminate how this contractual 
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